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I. INTRODUCTION
The years 1975-1982 witnessed the rapid expansion of
public sector expenditures, specifically, investments. This
is but a reflection of the active role played by the
government during this period. This development, together
with the poor revenue performance of the tax system and the
dismal internal cash generation capability of the government
corporate sector, has given rise to huge public sector
deficits. These large fiscal deficits is generally
perceived as having played a major role in the collapse of
the economy in 1983-84. Moreover, because of the heavy
emphasis on foreign loans in financing government deficit-
spending in the late seventies to early eighties, the
country is likely to face the grim prospect of high levels
of government deficits in the future.
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It is in this context that the present paper reviews
the country's experience with deficit-spending in the last
decade. Section 2 documents the size of the government
deficit in the period. This section presents the profile of
a consolidated public sector (i.e. national government
plus local government and 60 government corporations)
deficit for 1975-1984. In the past, a consistent time
series on this aggregate has not been available for the
Philippines. On the other hand, Section 3 reviews the
manner by which the government has chosen to finance the
fiscal deficit in the period, while section 4 focuses on the
economic consequences of deficit-financing of government
expenditures. In particular, the implications of the fiscal
deficit on public debt (foreign and domestic), interest
rate, capital formation, money creation, and inflation is
analyzed. Finally, Section 5 summarizes the lessons that
can be drawn from this experience.
It. THE SIZE OF THE PUBLIC SECTOR RESOURCE GAP
!
The last decade (1975-1984) is characterized by _n
unprecedented surge in public investments. From 1.5 per
cent of the gross national product (GNP) in 1971, public
sector investment averaged i0 per cent of GNP in 1975-19E14
(Table i). While gross domestic capital formation in t_Le
aggregate also jumped from 21 per cent of GNP in 1971 to 0
per cent of GNP in 1975-1984, it is the public sector which
played the lead role in this expansion. For the same
TABLE I CONSOLIDATED PUBLIC SECTOR INVESTMENT AND SAVINGS, 1975 - 1984,
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TABLE I: CONSOLIDATED PUBLIC SECTOR INVESTMENT AND SAVINGS, 1975-1984 (Cont'd|
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5period, the public sector's investment expenditures grew by
20.3 per cent per annum, while that of the private sector
lagged behind, with an average growth rate of 9.4 per cent
per year. Although the private sector maintained its
dominant position in capital formation, its share in gross
domestic capital formation (GDCF) consequently dwindled from
75.8 per cent in 1975 to 57.2 per cent in 1984 (Table 2).
This development may be attributed to the following
factors: (I) a conscious effort on the part of the
government to make up for the low public investment levels
in the earlier years; (2) the countercyclical public
expenditure program undertaken by the government in response
to the world recession of the early eighties; and (3)
increased availability of foreign loans in the period up to
1982.
On the other hand, public sector savings averaged 4.4
per cent of GNP in the decade. As a proportion of GNP,
public savings followed an inverted U pattern in the period,
with the peak occurring in 1979. A similar pattern was
exhibited by national government revenues. In terms of the
rate of growth of savings, the public sector also led the
private sector, although to a lesser extent. Public sector
savings expanded by 18.7 per cent while private sector
savings increased by only 12.2 per cent. Consequently, the
public sector's share in gross domestic savings rose from
15.1 per cent in 1975 to 22.6 per cent in 1984.
6TABLE 2: SAVINGS AND INVESTMENTS OF PUBLIC
AND PRIVATE SECTORI 1975-1985
(in million pesos)
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Table I.
7Nevertheless, public sector savings consistently lagged
behind public investments, averaging 5.3 per cent of GNP,
and this contributed to the large fiscal deficits prevalent
in the period. In contrast, private sector investment and
savings were about equal, on the average, in 1975-1984.
Public sector investments were largely carried out by
government corporations. Public sector enterprises (PSEs)
contributed 66.9 per cent of total public investments while
only 30.9 per cent may be attributed to the national
government (Table 3).
The distribution of public sector savings in 1975-1984
followed a pattern opposite that of capital expenditures.
The bulk of public sector savings (i.e. 89.2 per cent) came
from the national government while 19.9 per cent was
accounted for by PSEs (Table 4). Thus, the government
corporate sector, specifically the non-financial PSEs, was
the principal source of the fiscal deficit (Table i).
III. FINANCING OF THE PUBLIC SECTOR DEFICIT
The public sector relied heavily on foreign loans to
finance its expansionary expenditure program in the last
decade. Net external borrowing financed 31.3 per cent of
public investment or 57.0 per cent of the fiscal deficit in
the period. Net external financing was particularly high
relative to the resource gap in 1978-1980. In 1978, net
foreign borrowing even exceeded the fiscal deficit (Table
8TABLE :5 : PERCENTAGE DISTRIBUTION OF CAPITAL
EXPENDITURES OF THE PUBLIC SECTOR
BY LEVEL OF GOVERNMENT, 1975-1984
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9TABLE 4 : PERCENTAGE DISTRIBUTION OF SAVINGS
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5). Approximately two-thirds of public sector foreign
borrowing was contributed by PSEs while the remainder was on
account of the national government.
This lopsided dependence on foreign loans, a large
proportion of which were obtained at commercial rates, led
to the very rapid piling up of foreign debt by the public
sector. In turn, the ballooning external debt put
increasing pressure on the balance of payments and on the
budget deficit as debt servicing requirements grew in leaps
and bounds.
Only a small portion (6.7 per cent) of the deficit was
monetized in 1975-1984. Money creation was on a downtrend
from 1975 to 1979 but reversed its direction in 1980-1983.
In 1984, net claims of monetary authorities with the
government contracted, following the contractionary
monetary/ fiscal policy pursued by the government in the
wake of the 1983 debt-induced foreign exchange crisis.
Domestic borrowing, on the other hand, financed 36._
!
per cent of the deficit in the last decade. Domesti_
borrowing from non-Central Bank sources was significant in
the years 1976, 1981, and 1984 but negative in 1978 and
1980. This may be attributed to negative levels of net
domestic borrowing by the government corporate sector in si_
(6) years, from 1977-1980, and from 1982-1984. This, in
turn, may be explained by the burgeoning level of
TABLE 5" FINANCING OF PUBLIC SECTOR DEFICIT, 1975-1984
(in million pesos)
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arrearages in the credits/loans extended by the public
sector enterprises, and by the underdeveloped state of the
financial markets in the country.
IV. ECONOMIC IMPACT OF THE FISCAL DEFICIT
The size of the fiscal deficit, as well as the mannerl
by which it is financed, has widespread repercussions on the
rest of the economy. For one, deficit-financing may crowd
out private investments while money creation may lead to an
inflationary situation. For another, external financing may
result in balance of payments problems in the medium- and/or
long-run.
4.1 The Fiscal Deficit and the External Public Debt
and Its Servicing
Our earlier discussion shows that net external
borrowings financed the bulk of the mounting deficits of the
public sector. External public sector debt grew at a
tremendous pace of 21.5 per cent per annum during the period
1975-1985. As a consequence, its share in total outstanding
foreign debt expanded from 45.2 per cent in 1975 to 63.8 per
cent in 1984 (Table 6).
External debt presents both a budget problem and a
transfer problem (Goode, 1984). The public sector must
generate sufficient revenues to cover the service payments.
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TABLE 6: OUTSTANDING EXTERNAL DEBT, 1975-1985
(in million U.S. dollor$)
9overe_,M
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This is possible only if loans were used in productive
endeavors that pay for themselves. This essentially calls
for good economic management and is a concern for both
external and domestic debt management. In addition to this,
the servicing of foreign debt requires a transfer of
resources abroad. Thus, there is pressure to improve the
current account of the balance of payments, or otherwise
suffer a balance of payments crisis. To subvert this
potential crisis, the country needs to pursue deflationary
policies to correct the current account imbalance and/or to
undertake a currency devaluation.
The pressure on current year budgets resulting from the
imprudent recourse to foreign financing in earlier years
is evident from the increase in the proportion of total
national government expenditures devoted to debt service,
(principal repayments plus interest). Accordingly, the
proportion increased from 5.1 per cent to 41.4 per cent
between 1975 and 1984. While these figures include
servicing of domestic borrowings, the bulk must have gone to
i
foreign debt servicing, given the large share of foreig_
debt in outstanding public debt. In 1984, for instancei
external public debt accounted for 70.5 per cent of tota_
public debt (Table 7).
On the other hand, the excessive reliance on external
borrowing in financing the fiscal deficits in the last
decade is one of the primary factors that led to the balance
TABLE 7: OUTSTANDING PUBLIC DEBT, 1975-1984 15
( in million pesos)
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of payments crisis of 1983. The country's external debt
servicing capacity was continously strained in the period as
the debt-service ratio (ratio of principal plus interest to
merchandise and non-merchandise exports) rose from 15.5 per
cent in 1975 to 28.1 per cent in 1982, and to 46.9 per cent
!/
in 1986 (Table 8).
4.2 The Fiscal Deficit, Interest Rates and
Private Investment
In Section 2, we noted that a significant proportion of
the fiscal deficit in the last decade was funded by domestic
borrowing. Public sector domestic borrowing from domestic
banks and from non-bank sources compete with the private
sector in the use of domestic financial resources. Thus,
increased government spending financed by domestic borrowing
may crowd out private investments. In more developed
economies, the process by which the private sector is
crowded out is through higher interest rates. In less
developed countries with financially repressed economies,
private investment may be crowded out through the reduction
in the quantity of rationed credit made available to private
investors, rather than through the higher cost of financiall
resources, since interest rates are generally kept low
by fiat (McKinnon, 1973; Fry, 1980 and Remolona, 1985).
!/
The debt service ratios for 1983-1985 are not reflective I
of the true debt burden because of the debt moratorium I
declared by the Philippine government in 1983.
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TABLE 8 : EXTERNAL DEBT SERVICING RATIO
(in million U.S. dollors)
ExportF.arnings _ Se_ici_ DebtServi-
YnP |_ledlm 3 $el_ices Pr'ineip_| lwCmmmt Total ci_ _io
(1) (2) 12/1)
r
1975 3_1 3_ 1_ ,98 15.56
1976 _ f_5 _ 856 _.91
1977 _ 537 I_ 726 17.I#
1971 4r=m9 73@ 276 I_ _. 4_
1979 _ 761 _ I_ _.Ik_
i900 M|@ 799 6T3 I*7_ 18.38
I961 !1616 _, 9Q3 17,T._ _.
1_ MI7 717 11_1_ 13@9 _3.81
1985 _I? 60# 1111 1715 _1.66
1986 8IN 13@e I_ _ _._
9OU_-eS: _t_t of FCO_miCResearch- I_lo_l_ Ce_tPal_ of
'thePhili_)oines. t_na_,_ntof ExteP_al_ebt& l_ves_um_ts
_'¢,_t _e_aPteer_t,Ce_e_l _ of the _li_i_es.
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In the Philippines, the 1981 financial reform has
resulted in a more liberalized financial system but the
allocation of credit between public and private sector still
needs to be investigated, particularly for the pre-1981
period. After 1981, interest rate movements would be a more
important indicator of crowding out.
The proportion of net domestic credit expansion
appropriated by the public sector in financing its deficit
was large in 1975, 1984 and 1985. In eight (8) years out of
ii, the share of the private sector in nominal net domestic
credit expansion was larger than that of the public sector.
However, in 1984-1985, the net domestic credits accruing to
the private sector has contracted significantly (Table 9).
Thus, evidence based on credit allocation suggests that
1975, 1984 and 1985 are years when some crowding out may
have occurred. Moreover, the public sector's share in real
credit expansion is higher than its nominal share in the
nine-year period between 1975-1983, except in 1978 and 1979
(Table i0). This is indicative of growing pressure on
credit markets from the side of the public sector for the
seven (7) years.
Since 1981, the government has issued Treasury bills at
high rates of interest, with unprecedented high yields
I
offered particularly in 1984 and 1985 (Table ii).!
Businessmen have figured this development as one of the
factors that has led to low levels of private investment asi
I
TABLE 9 : SOURCES OF CHANGE IN NET DOMESTIC CREDIT IN NOMINAL TERMS, 1975-1985
f_r_ 15_ I976 1977 1"_78 l_tT"_ 1_ l_J6l 1_ 1_ 1_ I_
At'twin! _ in Le_,t,ls
(Tot,al) 875A _ 7787 11611 l_ 15653 _ eST_ L_uf_l(_ _ -le_=(D
N_C dq_est_._l __. _5 1_7 I_08 -I37 17 _ _ll 733_ -IN _ 1891
MDC(Local _overmmnt) --_1 -147 -18_ --67 --_13 -t_ -3_1_ 3_ --_3 412 J'_
NIX:(_v%. COrlXX_io_m) 17_ --_7_ _58 _ -IP.,_ -6_3 --43_ 3_9 68_ _ l,_.
(Plb]ic Sector1 39d_ file 1137 6# -1416 181_ ,._72 77_! 5135 346
N_C (Priv_e) 47?4 7312 665_ 11547 17816 138_1 16_J7_ 1_4_1_ L_77_ 4T'_ -1_19
Ikccz_age Diz_ribek io_
_C (To_=Z) IN.N IN,_I_ I_I_,W l_i_,N I(_.N I_I_N IN.N ltlL_ I_.N -IN.N -IN.N
_C (N_timl C=_ee_e_) _5.8_ 18._ 13.7_ -1.18 .le 15,35 _1.3_/ _.53 -4._ -_5,_ |8,G3
_I_ (Lo¢_! (]overeRet) -.E'k -1.75 -_..43 -.56 -I.38 -.fdi -I._ .13 -I.48 9.38 -._
,z
(8_%, C_t_t im) 19,87 -3,_; 3,3t _.3L -7,_ -4,11 -£,fl I,_ _.7_ _,_. 15,_;_
f_: (t_blic SL'CtO_) 4_,_ 13,_ 14,_=_ ,_5 "6,53 11,5_ 17.79 L-_.% 17. 17 7.86 -._4.r=_
• zn'¢_ of _si© _hrt_ C_¢_f,v't_l_ of' th_ Philippine.
I%1
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TABLE IO : SOURCES OF CHANGE IN REAL NET DOMESTIC CREDIT, 1975 - 1985
Itmt i"J'}'5 1"4"/6 l'_J"/7 l'J'/_ 197".J 13eO 1961 l"Je_ 1"_9.._ lgek I985
Rct;_l Cher_Jei_ Le,wli
N0C(Total} 3776.M_ _880.85 L"_._.tO 3_13.35 LM38.')6 1N5.'(_3 3_8.97 tt61B.31 35e_.6e -15,d_._ --5e55.36
f_C (Nmctiom=|_) 1_e6,3o_I_._ _,77.,_I-178.43 -t,_.67 7'_e.33 l_l_e.5:/t89_.8_ -83l._ -1776.94 -181.3;3
NgC (Local(k)vat'mm_ 15._'?. _,__.13 -(_.38 5.% -.L_.,'_JL_r.L_ -'5_,5e 48.66 "68.97 _1.55 _5.56
NgC(Govtt. Cof[x_itiors} 1012.07 -'_54.85 56.33 32.73 -6MJ.'_I -291.68 -155.07 <JE.P.._ 1"/_7._1 -_7.4_ -18.35
MiC (Peb)_c _=:-_=_') L_V_I.M! ,5_7_ k65.1_ -139.76 -'61_57 _6.N 1(leS.ee _636.70 857._ -17_.8_ -t73.1z
NBC(Peiyate_ 1_87,07 _.1_ t7'¢Je."J8 3353.|_. 36F-,_.=,_ _.4e3 ¢_53.% _-_73.6I ¢qf_7.56 -137'_'¢J_ =_-.*3r___=_5
_mg_ Distrit_io_
MBC(Total } 100.(10 J0O.N 1tie._le i(_.(l_ IN..N 100.00 100_N 100._ iN. (l_ -iN.N -iN,0_
(No4;i_! 6,o,wtreieyJt) 3B.7'_ _8.<3_. _l.l? -5.55 -.5.L----_ 63. I3 37,27 _l.i_ _ -11,_7 -3.10
(Local 6mmwamnt) .$1 -1.86 -3.08 .16 -1.(_ i_,51 -I.57 1,06 -1 .'_Y/r 1.56 .4,5
NIX: (_P_'k. Coe.m'_io_} _6.7_ -0.05 P_._ l.O_ -#_.56 -,_07 -_.76 _.,_ _,i,_ -t.34, -,31
14De(l_blic Sector) 65.% 18._1 _.rm?. --_.35 -28.07 _.77 30.84 _,18 _r_._ -11.25 -,?.%
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free Table_
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TABLE II : INTEREST RATES AND PUBLIC SECTORDEFICIT, 1975- 1985
( in percent)
[_flatiow recital _I [_ecest i_blicSeetoP
Ymr l_tere_tRate Rate l_efi_itas a
i_/5 8.31 1_,_ _. t7 ?.15
1976 9.19 10._1 i,_ 15.36
1977 7.3"_ 11.16 &Tt 3.kl
IF/8 9. 81 1e._ 1.7k 8. 3_
197_ 15.P.3 I_, i8 -3. _ 18.W
igM 15,L_ i_._. -3.E7 8._'1
i_I 1_._ l_,_l 1,% 1_._
I_E 8. _2 i_. _ 5. 99 9. 8I
I_B_ #9. ¢/ 36,98 -1_. _R 8. 19
t_85 17.55 _7,_ 9.5 9.68
at
Bmmdon _P i_mlici_ iz-ic,e iwler_ Na'tio_el fiL'CCSmts_aff.
gei_ted _ _o_ri_elintereslwareon allmt_i¢ies of T_sm"y
_ills_Centralt_..
ftmi_tali_tm'_t_te ¢ims inflat_o_rate.
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well as to increased production costs in these years.
Furthermore, an examination of the relative movements of
real interest rates, (as measured by nominal interest rate
on Treasury bills minus inflation rate) and the size of the
fiscal deficit, (as measured by the ratio of the total
public sector deficit to GNP) show that there is a positive
relationship between these two (2) variables in four (4)
(i.e. in 1981, 1983, 1984 and 1985) out of the six (6)
observation points available under the liberalized regime.
On the other hand, in the financially repressed period prior
to 1981, such a direct correlation between the fiscal
deficit and the real interest rate was observed in only two
(2) (i.e. 1978 and 1980) out of five (5) years. These
developments validate our a priori expectations on the
manner by which the public sector has crowded out the
private sector in the last decade. The evidence also
indicate that crowding out of private sector investments has
indeed taken place in 1985.
4.3 The Fiscal Deficit, Money Creation and the
Price Level
The fiscal deficit is said to be monetized when the
government/public sector borrows from the Central Bank (CB)
to cover its deficit. Money creation takes the form of an
increase in net credits of the CB to the public sector.
Other things held constant, because of the CB's balance
i
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sheet identity, CB net lending to the public sector results
in an increase in the stock of high-powered money.
An increase in government spending financed by money
creation leads to an increase in aggregate spending. In
turn, the increased demand induces higher prices,
additional output, (if over capacity is present) and a
worsening of the current account as imports rise relative to
exports. Because of supply bottlenecks, the output response
to increased demand is usually limited. At the same time,
the availability of international reserves effectively puts
a cap on import expansion. Thus, inflation tends to be the
more important problem associated with money creation.
Our earlier discussion of the sources of financing of
the fiscal deficit indicate that money creation covered a
small portion of the public sector deficit in 1975-1984.
This should not mislead us, however, into believing that the
impact of money creation on other economic variables is also
small. Looking at the sources of change in high-powered or
reserve money, we observe that monetization of the fiscal
deficit accounts for a significant proportion of the total
change in reserve money, particularly in 1976, 1980-1982,
and 1985 (see Table 12).
Government borrowing from the commercial banking system
may result in net addition to the money supply if deposit
money banks have excess reserves, or if the Central Bank
provides them with supplemental reserves through
rediscounting or the provision of loans and advances.
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The impact of money creation on reserve money, money
supply and prices may be summarized by the following regres-
sions based on national government data:
log Mt = 6.12 + .45 log HNG (i)
(6.47) t
R2 = .82
and
e
log P = 3.36 - 1.34 log Y + .03z
t (-2.40) t (2.81)t (2)
+ .80 log (M/P) + 1.39 log Mt
(2.20) %-I(8.50)
R2 = .98
Estimation Period: 1975 - 1985
where: M = money supply defined as currency int
circulation plus demand deposit;
HNG net claims of CB on the government;
t
= the CPI index; and
Y = real GNP
t
ze = expected inflation rate which was
estimated by minimizing the expected
!/
losses from forecast errors.
Equation 2 is one of the equations in the Aghevli-Khan
model of inflation and government deficits. For a more
detailed discussion of this model as applied to Philippine
data, refer to Appendix A. Due to data constraints, we were
unable to estimate the model for the consolidated public
sector.
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Equation (i) suggests that a i0 per cent growth in net
CB credits to national government will result in a 4.5
per cent increase in money supply. Meanwhile, equation (2)
indicates that a 4.5 per cent increase in money supply would
in turn result to a 6.2 = 4.5 (1.39) per cent increase in
the CPI index. Furthermore, we note that between 1975
and 1983, H expanded by 38.6 per cent annually. However,
NG t
it has declined by 32.6 per cent in 1984, and then increased
again by 48.7 percent in 1985. These indicate that money
creation may have contributed significantly tO inflation in
the years 1976, 1980-1982 and 1985.
It is also worth noting that the change in net foreign
assets of the CB from 1979 to 1985 is negative, indicative
of the build-up, the explosion and the aftermath of the
balance-of-payments and debt crisis of 1983. Remolona and
Lamberte (1986) pointed out that the financial reforms
implemented in 1981 resulted in "a shift away from holding
of currency on the part of the public and from holding of
reserves on the part of banks. As a consequence, increments
in base money 1981 and 1982 fell far short of CB holdings to
the national government... This meant that other sources of
base money creation had to suffer. One such other source
CB liquidity credit to commercial banks, did declinq
somewhat but not nearly enough to accomodate the credil
requirements of the national government. As it turned out
the entire burden of accomodation was placed on CB holdings
i
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of international reserves". Thus, as the story goes, because
the demand of the government on money creation exceeded "the
willingness of the public to absorb it, household and firms
find themselves holding more local currency than they
desire, and this somehow find its way to an increased demand
for foreign goods and/or foreign assets... Either way of
getting rid of excess pesos will be reflected in the
worsening of recorded current account balance and a
depletion of exchange reserves". In 1983, this situation
reached such an alarming proportion that a drastic
devaluation became inevitable. The deflationary policies
that followed, the resulting recession, and the havoc it
wreaked on industry and the economy have become part of
recent history.
4.4 The Impact of Inflation on the Fiscal Deficit
More recent developments in the economic literature
recognize that there is a two-way relationship between
money supply and inflation.
While the earlier studies emphasized the process by
which changes in money supply causes inflation, later works
point out that changes in the price level may induce changes
in money supply. The intereaction between the government
fiscal deficit and inflation is seen as the most vital
factor in the interface between these two variables. It is
hypothesized that inflation results in a growing fiscal
28
deficit, (because government expenditures respond
faster to inflation than government revenues) which if
financed by money creation, gives rise to increases in money
supply that causes further increases in prices (Dutton 1971;
Aghevli and Khan 1977).
Using national government data, the following relation-
ships between government revenues, R, expenditures, G, real
income, Y, the price level, P, money supply, M, money
multiplier, m, and a residual item, E = H - G + R, where H
is reserve money were estimated:
log Gt = 9.37 + 1.34 log Yt + .03 log (G/P)t_ 1(3.70) (.ii) (3)
+ .80 log P
(15.62) t
log R = 3.47 + .78 (log Y + log P )
(2.86) t t (4)
+ .05 log R
(.14) t-1
and
logM = 133+ 87 logG- o02logRt
(1.08) _(-.002) (5)
+ .21 log _ + .88 log mt
(1.39) (2.41)
Estimation Period: 1975-1985
4/
Refer to Appendix A for details.
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Our estimates of the adjustment coefficients for G and R,
are 0.97 and 0.95, respectively, which confirms the Aghevli-
Khan proposition that expenditures adjust faster to price
changes than revenues do. However, both of these
coefficients are not significantly different from unity
implying that both government expenditures and revenues
adjust promptly to inflation. But since our revenue data
includes discretionary effects, our estimate of the
adjustment coefficient for revenues tends to be biased
upwards. Thus, the evidence suggests that revenues do lag
behind expenditures in adjusting to inflation, and this may
have resulted in a widening of the deficit as a result of
inflation.
V. CONCLUSION
It is apparent from the above discussion that the right
mix of financing instruments has eluded the government for
the most part of the last decade. For instance, the lure of
financing its expansionary expenditure program by net
foreign borrowings in 1977-1982 proved to be unsustainable
as the public sector deficit ballooned out of proportion in
later years. On the other hand, the rate of money creation
get by the government in the early eighties proved to
be out of sync with other economic factors. These events
have contributed to the BOP crisis in 1983 that triggered
the massive devaluation in the same year. Similarly, the
government has relied too much on deficit-financing in 1984-
I3O
1985, resulting in the crowding out of private investment
and the jacking up of interest rates. This suggests the
need to exercise prudence in the choice of means to finance
the government deficit. Specifically, consistent fiscal,
exchange rate, and monetary policies are required.
More important than this, however, is the need for a
conservative fiscal policy. The financing in whatever
fashion of a small deficit is definitely more manageable
than that of a larger one. The magnitude of a given
deficit, particularly a large one, oftentimes constrains
policymakers to adopt a financing mix that requires abrupt
movements in key economic variables that usually results in
stop and go economic growth. Government expenditures in
1977-1982, while low by international standards, were high
relative to government resources and the deficit figures
they spawn proved to be unsustainable. This leads us to
stress the importance of implementing measures to improve
the resource mobilization performance of the public sector;
!
namely: (i) improvement in tax administration and ta_
structure; and (2) improvement in efficiency /internal cas
generation of government corporations. The latter measure
is even more critical considering the gargantuan debt burde,
that is certain to form part of government budgets in the
near future unless the government is able to avail itself oJ
some debt relief. Needless to say, streamlining oJ
government operations to cut down on unnecessary cost is
essential.
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An Application of the Aghevli-Khan Model of
Government Deficits and Inflation to the Philippines
Aghevli and Khan (1978) examined the relationship
between money supplyand inflation. They start with the
proposition that there exists a two-way causality between
money supply and inflation. They hypothesize that inflation
gives rise to growing fiscal deficits, (because revenues lag
behind expenditures in adjusting to price changes) which
further increases money supply, (because of money creation)
and consequently, induces more inflation.
They formulate the model as follows:
(i) The demand for real money balances is a function of the
level of real income and the opportunity cost of
holding assets in the form of money, i.e. the expected
rate of inflation:
log (M/p)Dt = a0 + al log Yt - a2_ (i)
where:
M = stock of nominal money balances
P = price level
Y = level of real income
e
= expected rate of inflation
D = demand
i
I
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The actual stock of real money balances is assumed
to adjust proportionally to the difference between the
demand for real money balances and the actual stock in the
previous period,
Alog (M/P t) = l[log (M/P) D= log (M/P__ 1 3. (2)
where I denotes the coefficient of adjustment.
The expected rate of inflation is assumed to be
generated by an adaptive expectation mechanism such that
e [ __e ] (3)
A_t = _t t- 1
where :
8 = denotes the coefficient of expectations
and
= denotes the current rate of inflation i.e.
t
_t = log _ - log Pt-i
Subst<tuting (i) into (2) and solving for the price
level, we get
log % = -I_ - la I log Y + la e (4)t 2 t
- (I -I ) log (M/P)t_ 1 + log M t-
(ii) Desired real government expenditures is a function of
the level of real income:
D
log (G/P)t = % + gl log Y (5)t
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It is assumed that actual real expenditures adjust
to the difference between desired real expenditures
and actual real expenditures in the previous period,
i.e.
aog (G/P) = _ [log (GlP)t -log (G/P) ]
t-1 (6)
where _ is the coefficient of adjustment of government
expenditures.
Substituting (5) into (6) and solving for nominal
expenditures we obtain:
logGt = _g0+ _gllogYt + (i- 2) log (alP__I
+ log P , (7)
t
(iii) Desired nominal revenues of the government, R, is a
function of the level of nominal income:
log RD = to + t I (log Y + log P ) (8)
t t t
Actual revenues are assumed to adjust to the
difference between desired revenue and actual revenue
in the previous period:
Alog Rt = _[log RD - log R ] (9)t t-I
where • is the coefficient of adjustment of revenues.
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Substituting (8) into (9) and solving for nominal
revenues :
log Rt = Tt0 + Tt (log Yt + log Pt )
(lo)
+ (i _ T ) log Rt_ 1 .
(iv) The supply of money, M, is multiplicatively related
to the stock of high-powered money, H, via the money
multiplier, m:
M = mt H (ll)
t t
Changes in high-powered money is the sum of changes
in net claims of the CB on the government, H and
changes in international reserves plus changes in
CB's net claims on commercial banks and private
sectors, H , such that:
AH = AH + AH (12)
t NG 0A
t t
or
+ AH + H (13)
t oAt t-1
If it is assumed that AH = G - R ,
NG t t
then equation(13)becomes:
Ht = Gt Rt + Et (14
where:
E = AH + H .
t 0A t-i
t
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It is assumed here that an increase in the deficit
results automatically in an equal change in stock of
reserve money. This is true only to the extent that
the deficit is financed by borrowing from the CB, money
creation. If deficits were funded by deficit financing,
then this assumption is no longer valid. Aghevli and
Khan points out that the scope for open market
operations in LDCs is limited so that the former
assumption is generally valid in these countries.
Substituting equation (14) in equation (12) we get
M t = m t (G t - R t + Et) (15)
Equation (15) may be approximated by a relationship
linear in logarithms (to make estimation more
convenient) such that :
log S t = log m t + K O + _ log Gt - _ log R t
+ K log E (16)
3 t
In this system, if the price level increases (for
whatever reason, this will result in an increase in
both G and R. If T < 2, i.e. if expenditures adjust
faster to inflation than revenues, then the fiscal
deficit will increase. This will cause money supply to
rise and the price level will go up some more, etc.
Thus, we obtain the situation where an inflation-
induced fiscal deficit gives rise to sustained
inflation and a widening deficit.
36
Equations (4), (7), (10) and (16) were estimated
by using three-stage least squares and equation (3) was
estimated by using the Nugent and Glezakos (1979)
criterion of minimizing expected losses from forecasts
errors using Philippine data. The structural equation
estimates obtained from this exercise are as followsz
e
1 log_ --336- 134logY + 03_
(-2.401 (2.81)
+ .80 log (M /P)t-i + 1.39 log Mt
(2.20) (8.50)
G = 9.37 + 1.34 log Y + .03 log (G/P) t2. log t t -1
(3.70) (.11)
+ .80 log Pt
(15.62)
3 log Rt = 3.47 + .78 (log Y + log P ) + .05 log R" t t t-i
(2.86) (.14)
4. log M = 1.33 + .87 log G - .002 log R
t (i.08) t (-.002) t
+ .21 log Et + .88 log m
(1.39) (2.41) t
5. A_e = .4 [ _ - e ]
t t t-i
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The effect of income on revenues and expenditures
in the short-run is positive and significant. The
adjustment coefficient for expenditures and revenues
are 0.97 and 0.95, respectively, and both are not
significantly different from unity. This implies that
both variables adjust almost automatically to keep pace
with inflation. Since revenue data includes
discretionary effects, our estimate of T may be biased
upwards. Consequently, it is likely that T < _ for the
Philippines, implying that revenues lag behind
expenditures in adjusting to inflation.
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